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IN ANTITRUST WE (DO NOT) TRUST1
Christopher L. Colvin2
I will be teaching industrial organization (IO) to under­
graduates next year. It is a brand new course, and so I have been 
trawling though the websites of IO teachers around the world 
for inspiration. Overall, I have been quite perplexed with what 
I have found: undergraduates seem to be fed material that is 
very theoretical and computational, with little or no context or 
application. Perhaps this prepares students well for graduate 
programs in economics, but the vast majority of economics 
undergraduates are not going to be doing a PhD. And even those 
that do will require exposure to some empirical research.
I want my students to use their microeconomics, to get 
them  to appreciate that real life is dirtier than in the models. 
And I want them to understand that economic ideas are not 
fixed in time and space, that a log-run perspective can reveal 
very different insights about hum an behavior. I plan to do so by 
limiting the use of textbooks and instead delving into academic 
papers and antitrust cases. I feel economic history should play 
center stage in an economics degree, not relegated to being an 
obscure field study. So, when teaching sunk costs and market 
structure, I will look at the decline of Europe’s film industry in 
the early twentieth century;3 when covering collusion, I will set 
them  the US sugar cartel of the 1930s;4 when explaining natural 
monopolies, I will examine Victorian railways;5 and when look­
ing at the efficacy of patents, I will do nineteenth century alter­
natives.6
I am also keen to find something accessible that students 
can use to appreciate the origins and evolution of competition 
policy -  including why it differs by place, and how legal deci­
sions based on economic arguments made long ago still have 
resonance today. I want to teach them  some history of economic
1 An older version of this comment was posted on the NEP-HIS blog (http:// 
www.nephis.org/), a weekly blog that discusses new working papers in business, 
economic and financial history sourced from the RePEc digital library (http:// 
repec.org/).
2 Affiliation: Queens University Belfast. Email: chris.colvin@qub.ac.uk.
3 Bakker (2005).
4 Genesove and Mullin (2001).
5 Freman-Peck (1987).
6 Brunt, Lerner and Nicholas (2011).
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thought. One paper that I hope to discuss in this context is 
Nicola Giocoli’s new working paper, entitled “British econo­
mists on competition policy (1890-1920)”.7 Giocoli, an Associate 
Professor of Economics at the University of Pisa, looks at the 
reaction in the UK to the advent of antitrust in the US.8 He finds 
that academically and politically influential British economists 
Herbert S. Foxwell, David H. McGregor and Alfred Marshall 
were dead against US-style anti-m onopoly legislation. They 
believed it would be difficult to implement, run counter to the 
ideals of a free market, and be inappropriate in the UK indus­
trial context.9 The UK had to wait until 1948 for the Monopolies 
and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1965 for the 
Monopolies and Mergers Act, and 1998 for a fully independent 
competition authority.10
W hat I think is particularly im portant about Giocoli's paper 
for my students' understanding of the evolution of IO is his 
description of a transform ation in what economists thought 
com petition entailed. For classical economists, com petition 
was about firm conduct; they adopted a dynamic process-based 
view of competition. For the neoclassical economists that fol­
lowed, com petition was m ore about m arket structure, the 
m arket condition; this static view was more concerned with 
business size and the num ber of competitors. For someone 
teaching m odem  IO theory, this is fascinating. Over the last two 
(or three) decades, IO has seen a paradigm shift from the old 
structure-conduct-performance view of competition -  which pri­
marily concerned itself with measuring market structure -  to the 
so-called "new industrial organization” view -  which, apparently 
much like the view held by the economists described by Giocoli, 
is far more concerned with figuring out firm conduct and does 
not necessarily draw a causal link between structure and perfor­
m ance.11 In short, it appears we have come full circle.
I like Giocoli’s paper because he tries to marry his history of 
economic thought with up-to-date research in economic history. 
Instead of seeing the US as a success and Britain as a failure -  a 
view associated with the work of business historian Alfred D.
7 Giocoli (2012).
8 The Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts (1890 and 1914) were introduced 
at a time when the UK had no codified competition policy.
9 US economists too were very divided on the efficacy of antitrust at the time, 
see Hovenkamp (2010).
10 Motta (2004), pp. 11-13.
11 See Lipczynski, Wilson and Goddard (2009), Chapters 1-5, for an accessible 
introduction to m odem approach to IO theory.
2
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 39 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 11
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol39/iss2/11
120 Accounting Historians Journal, December 2012
Chandler12 -  Giocoli argues that competition law was unneces­
sary because Britain was largely still a success, ahead of every­
one else terms of total factor productivity -  it did not require 
government intervention in the form of antitrust legislation. I 
would encourage Giocoli to further develop this argum ent by 
looking at some of the work of LSE business historian Leslie 
Hannah, whose career has been devoted to debunking Chandler. 
His articles show that the “Chandlerian corporation” was actu­
ally far more a thing of Europe than America.13 A monopolist 
like Standard Oil -  the company whose breakup must be central 
to any history of antitrust -  was the exception rather than the 
rule. US capitalism is a story of small family-run enterprise, not 
big business. How does this revision of the business history af­
fect Giocoli's argument?
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